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1Relay Selection for Security Enhancement in
Cognitive Relay Networks
Yuanwei Liu, Lifeng Wang, Tran Trung Duy, Maged Elkashlan, and Trung Q. Duong
Abstract—This letter proposes several relay selection policies
for secure communication in cognitive decode-and-forward (DF)
relay networks, where a pair of cognitive relays are opportunisti-
cally selected for security protection against eavesdropping. The
first relay transmits the secrecy information to the destination,
and the second relay, as a friendly jammer, transmits the
jamming signal to confound the eavesdropper. We present new
exact closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability.
Our analysis and simulation results strongly support our conclu-
sion that the proposed relay selection policies can enhance the
performance of secure cognitive radio. We also confirm that the
error floor phenomenon is created in the absence of jamming.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, cooperative networks, physical
layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio networks are confronted with new privacy
and security risks, due to the broadcast nature of wireless
channels. Such security threats of eavesdropping are further
escalated by the distributed nature of future multi-tier cog-
nitive radio deployments. Physical (PHY) layer security, as
an appealing approach to achieve secure transmission, has
aroused wide-spread interest [1]. With this in mind, PHY layer
security has been considered in cognitive radio networks [2].
Also, several recent efforts have considered PHY layer secu-
rity in cooperative communications [3–8]. Among them [3]
introduced cooperative transmission for security enhancement
with single antenna and with multiple antennas. In [4], several
cooperative relaying schemes were proposed to increase the
secrecy rate, including decode-and-forward (DF), amplify-
and-forward (AF), and cooperative jamming (CJ). In [5],
collaborative relay weights for CJ were optimized to maximize
the secrecy rate. In [6], two secrecy transmission schemes were
proposed in opportunistic relaying. Joint relay and jammer
selection for security enhancement was examined in one-way
DF relay networks [7] and in two-way AF relay networks [8],
where jamming was considered as a useful approach to resist
security attacks.
Contrary to previous efforts, we focus on the security of
cognitive relay networks where the transmit power of the cog-
nitive relay is constrained. In this network, a pair of cognitive
relays are selected. The first relay, as a helper, transmits the
confidential messages to the legitimate destination, while the
malicious eavesdropper tries to overhear the communication.
Y. Liu, L. Wang, and M. Elkashlan are with Queen Mary University of
London, London, UK.
T. T. Duy is with Posts and Telecommunications Institute of Technology,
Vietnam.
T. Q. Duong is with Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK.
The second relay, as a friendly jammer, transmits a jamming
signal to corrupt the received signals at the eavesdropper.
Our contributions are at least two-fold: 1) we propose and
compare four relay selection policies, namely random relay
and random jammer (RRRJ), random jammer and best relay
(RJBR), best relay and best jammer (BRBJ), and best relay and
no jammer (BRNJ); and 2) we characterize the joint impact
of the proposed relay selection policies and the interference
power constraint on the secrecy performance by deriving
new exact closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage
probability. We show that the proposed policies offer a secrecy
performance/implementation trade-off. We also show that the
absence of the jammer gives rise to the outage saturation
phenomenon.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider the secure communication in a cognitive relay
network consisting of one secondary user (SU) source (S),
M +1 DF cognitive relays fRmg (m = 1; 2;    ;M +1), one
primary user (PU) receiver (P), one SU destination (D), and
one eavesdropper (E). All the nodes are equipped with a single
antenna and operate in half-duplex mode. In such a network,
the cognitive relays are allowed to share the same spectrum
as the PU under interference power constraint. Because of the
absence of the direct links, the signal transmitted by S cannot
be received by the eavesdropper, hence the transmission during
broadcast phase is secure. Assuming that the source and the
relays are located in the same cluster, yielding high received
SNRs at the DF relays for successful decoding of messages
[7], we concentrate on the cooperative phase in the presence
of eavesdropping1. A pair of relays are selected among M+1
relays, such that the first relay, denoted as Rc, transmits the
secrecy information; and the second relay, denoted as Rj , trans-
mits the jamming signal as a jammer. We consider the active
eavesdropper scenario where the channel state information
(CSI) between the relays and the eavesdropper is available2 [4,
9]. Such a scenario is particularly applicable in multicast and
unicast networks where the users play dual roles as legitimate
receivers for some signals and eavesdroppers for others [4].
All the channels are subject to slow, flat, block Rayleigh
fading, where the fading coefficients are constant during a
codeword transmission. Let us denote Dm, 
P
m , and 
E
m as
the channel power gains of Rm ! D, Rm ! P, and Rm ! E
links, respectively. The channel power gains Dm, 
P
m, and
1In DF relay networks, the transmission of the broadcast phase has little
effect on our proposed schemes of the secure transmission in the cooperative
phase.
2The CSI among all the nodes can be obtained at the SU source with the
assistance of the relays.
2Em are exponentially distributed random variables (RVs) with
parameters D = (dD), P = (dP), and E = (dE),
respectively, where dD , dP, and dE denote the distance of
Rm ! D, Rm ! P, and Rm ! E links, respectively, and 
represents the path-loss exponent.
In this underlay network, the SU terminals must limit their
transmit powers so that the interference inflicted at the PU
does not exceed the maximum allowable interference power
limit Ith. To deal with this, the transmit powers at the relay
Rc and the jammer Rj are given as
Pc =
Ith
Pc
and Pj =
(1  )Ith
Pj
; (1)
respectively, where  is the power allocation factor, 0 <  6
1. Note that  = 1 corresponds to no jamming. We assume
that the interfering signal from the cooperative jammer Rj can
be shared by the destination with specific method (e.g. use the
seed of the random noise generator in a secure fashion [10]).
This assumption helps us understand the performance limits
and properties of cooperative jamming, and has been seen in
prior works such as [10, 11]. After canceling the interference
component, the instantaneous received SNR at the destination
is given by
	D =
Pc
N0
Dc =
Qt
Pc
Dc ; (2)
where N0 is the noise power and Qt = Ith=N0 is the
transmit SNR of the network. Since the interfering signal is un-
known at the eavesdropper, the instantaneous received signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper is
given by
	E =
Pc
E
c
N0 + PjEj
=
Qt
E
c
Pc
 
1 + (1  )QtEj=Pj
 : (3)
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we focus on several relay selection policies
with low implementation complexity. We consider constant
secret rate applications that operate under short-term power
constraints, typically found in device to device networks (i.e.,
ad hoc networks) and sensor networks. Such networks can
suffer from outage despite CSI known at the transmitter. In
this scenario, the secrecy outage probability is a meaningful
metric to characterize the secrecy performance and has been
considered in several prior works including the well-known
[?]. Given the expected secrecy rate Rth, a secrecy outage
is declared when the instantaneous secrecy rate drops below
Rth. As such, we provide new closed-form expressions for the
secrecy outage probability. These new results will enable us
to examine and compare the benefits of the proposed policies.
Based on (2) and (3), the secrecy rate is expressed as [7–9]
I = [log2(1 + 	D)  log2(1 + 	E)]+ ; (4)
where [x]+ = maxfx; 0g. From (4), on the one hand, we
find that increasing the instantaneous received SNR at the
destination increases the secrecy rate. On the other hand, de-
creasing the instantaneous received SINR at the eavesdropper
increases the secrecy rate. With this in mind, we propose and
analyze four different relay selection policies in cognitive relay
networks, namely random relay and random jammer (RRRJ),
random jammer and best relay (RJBR), best relay and best
jammer (BRBJ), and best relay and no jammer (BRNJ).
A. Random Relay and Random Jammer (RRRJ)
We first consider the RRRJ policy as a baseline for com-
parison purposes. In this case, the relay Rc and the jammer Rj
are selected randomly. As such, the secrecy outage probability
for RRRJ is formulated as
P outRRRJ = Pr (IRRRJ < Rth)
= Pr
0B@ 1 + QtDc=Pc
1 +
QtEc
Pc
 
1+(1 )QtEj=Pj
 < 
1CA ; (5)
where Rth is the expected secrecy rate and  = 2Rth .
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability for RRRJ is
given by
P outRRRJ =1 
!1E (1  !2)
E (1  !2) + D
  !1ED!2
(E (1  !2) + D)2
ln

E + D
E!2

; (6)
where !1 = PQt= (PQt + D (  1)) and !2 =
P (1  )Qt=E.
Proof: See Appendix A.
From (6), we see that the secrecy outage probability for RRRJ
is independent of the number of relays.
B. Random Jammer and Best Relay (RJBR)
In this policy, we first select a random jammer Rj . Without
loss of the generality, we assume that the jammer is Rj =
RM+1. As such, the instantaneous secrecy rate at the relay
Rm (m = 1; 2;    ;M) is calculated as
ImRJBR = log2
0@1 + QtDm=Pm
1 +
QtEm
Pm(1+Y1)
1A; (7)
where Y1 = (1  )QtEj=Pj . Then, the best relay Rc is
selected to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate as Rc =
argmax
m=1;2; ;M
ImRJBR. Therefore, the secrecy outage probability for
RJBR is formulated as
P outRJBR = Pr
0@ max
m=1;2; ;M
0@1 + QtDm=Pm
1 +
QtEm
Pm(1+Y1)
1A < 
1A : (8)
Theorem 2: The secrecy outage probability for RJBR is
given by
P outRJBR =(1  !1)M +
MX
m=1

M
m

(1  !1)M m!2(!1(!3   1))m

"
a1 ln

!2
!3

+
a2
!2
+
mX
t=2
at
(t  1) (!3)t 1
#
;
(9)
where !3 = 1 + D=E, a1 = m(!3 !2)m+1 , a2 =
1
(!3 !2)m ,
and at = m t+1(!3 !2)m t+2 .
Proof: See Appendix B.
3C. Best Relay and Best Jammer (BRBJ)
In this policy, we first select the best relay that maximizes
the channel power gain between the relay and the destination.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the best relay Rc
is RM+1, i.e., DM+1 = max
m=1;2; ;M+1
(Dm). Then, the best
jammer Rj is selected among the remaining M relays to
maximize the interference power at the eavesdropper, such
that Rj : argmax
m=1;2; ;M
((1  )QtEm=Pm). In such a policy,
the instantaneous secrecy rate is expressed as
IBRBJ = log2
0@1 + QtY2=PM+1
1 +
QtEM+1
PM+1(1+Y3)
1A; (10)
where Y2 = max
m=1;2;M+1
(Dm) and Y3 =
max
n=1;2; ;M
((1  )QtEn=Pn) are statistically independent.
The secrecy outage probability for BRBJ is formulated as
P outBRBJ = Pr

Y2 <
  1
Qt
PM+1 + 
EM+1
(1 + Y3)

: (11)
Theorem 3: The secrecy outage probability for BRBJ is
given in (12) at the top of next page, where # =
E(1 !2)+mD
E+mD
and 2F 1 (; ; ; ) is the Gauss hypergeometric
function [12, Eq. (9.142)].
Proof: The proof can be done in the similar way as the
proof of Theorem 1.
D. Best Relay and No Jammer (BRNJ)
In this policy, no jamming protection is utilized. As such, the
instantaneous secrecy rate at relay Rm (m = 1; 2;    ;M + 1)
is calculated as
ImBRNJ = log2

1 +Qt
D
m=
P
m
1 +QtEm=
P
m

: (13)
The best relay Rc is selected so as to maximize the secrecy
rate, such that Rc : argmax
m=1;2; ;M+1
ImBRNJ. Therefore, the secrecy
outage probability for BRNJ is derived as
P outBRNJ = Pr

max
m=1;2; ;M+1

1 +Qt
D
m=
P
m
1 +QtEm=
P
m

< 

=

1  EPQt
(E + D) (PQt + D (  1))
M+1
: (14)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical results are presented to highlight the impact of
relay selection on secure transmission of cognitive DF relay
networks. The secrecy outage probability analytical curves for
different relay selection policies are obtained from (6), (9),
(12), and (14), respectively. In a two-dimensional topology, we
assume that the co-ordinates of the relays (R), the destination
(D), PU (P) and the eavesdropper (E), are (xR; 0), (1; 0),
(xP; yP), and (xE; yE), respectively. Hence, the distances are
calculated as dD = 1   xR, dP =
q
(xR   xP)2 + y2P , and
dE =
q
(xR   xE)2 + y2E . In the simulations, we assume the
path-loss exponent  = 3.
Fig. 1 plots the secrecy outage probability versus Qt for
M = 2. We assume that there are 3 relays (M + 1 = 3). We
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Fig. 1. Secrecy outage probability with M = 2, Rth = 1, and  = 0:75.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability with M = 2, Rth = 0:75, and Qt = 5
dB.
place the relays, PU, and eavesdropper at positions fxR; 0g =
f0:5; 0g, fxP; yPg = f0:5; 0:5g, and fxE; yEg = f0:75; 0:6g,
respectively. We see that there is an error floor for BRNJ
without jammer. This discouraging phenomenon is avoided
by using jamming protection for RRRJ, RJBR, and BRBJ.
We also see that BRBJ enhances the secrecy performance and
achieves the lowest secrecy outage probability among the four
proposed policies, however, it demands more instantaneous
feedbacks and system overhead.
Fig. 2 plots the secrecy outage probability versus  for
different relay selection policies. We place the relays, PU
and the eavesdropper at the positions fxR; 0g = f0:5; 0g,
fxP; yPg = f0:5; 0:5g, fxE; yEg = f1; 0:5g, respectively. We
see that different power allocations have a direct impact on
the secrecy outage probability except BRNJ (no jammer with
 = 1). For a given , BRBJ offers the lowest secrecy outage
probability among the four proposed policies. In addition,
RJBR outperforms RRRJ. We also see that the optimal  lies
in the medium region of (0,1]. This is due to the fact that a
certain amount of energy needs to be allocated to the relay to
deliver the source messages, and the remainder is allocated to
the jammer to improve the security.
In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we also provide Monte Carlo sim-
ulations of the optimal relay selection policy which jointly
selects the best relay and the best jammer to maximize the
4P outBRBJ =
M+1X
m=0
( 1)m

M + 1
m

PQt
PQt +mD (  1)
MX
n=1

M
n

(!2)
n
"
E
E +mD
n
2F 1

1; n;n+ 1;#

 
n
n+ 1
E (1  !2)
E +mD
2F 1

1; n+ 1;n+ 2;#

  1

  ( 1)
nE
(E +mD) (!2)
n +
n 1X
k=1
( 1)k+nk!
kQ
p=0
(n  p)
mnD(E)
k
(!2)
n k
(E +mD)
k+1
#
; (12)
secrecy rate. From the simulation results, we see that optimal
relay selection achieves the lowest secrecy outage probability.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the analytical result
of this policy is mathematically intractable, therefore we leave
this policy for further investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
We considered relay and jammer selection in cognitive
decode-and-forward (DF) relay networks with security con-
straints. We proposed four relay selection policies. Based
on these policies, we derived new closed-form expressions
for secrecy outage probability. The performance behavior of
the proposed relay selection policies are showcased. Further
study may consider other relay selection policies including the
optimal relay selection policy which jointly selects the best
relay and the best jammer to maximize the secrecy rate.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let Z = Ec= (1 + Y1) with Y1 = (1  )QtEj=Pj , we
rewrite (5) as
P outRRRJ =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FDc

  1
Qt
x+ z

fPc (x) fZ (z) dxdz :
(A.1)
Here, fZ (z) is the PDF of Z, we remind that the cumula-
tive density function (CDF) and probability density function
(PDF) of the random variables (RVs) Xm , X 2 fD; P; Eg are
FXm (x) = 1  e Xx and fXm (x) = Xe Xx, respectively.
By substituting the CDF FDc (x) and PDF fPc (x) into (A.1),
after some manipulations, (A.1) is given by
P outRRRJ =
Z 1
0
 
1  !1e Dz

fZ (z) dz ; (A.2)
where !1 = PQt= (PQt + D (  1)). To obtain fZ (z),
we first calculate the CDF of Y1 as FY1 (y) = 1  !2y+!2 with
!2 = P (1  )Qt=E. Taking the derivative of FY1 (y) with
respect to (w.r.t.) y, we obtain the PDF of Y1 as
fY1 (y) =
!2
(y + !2)
2 : (A.3)
Then, the CDF of Z can be formulated as
FZ (z) =
Z 1
0

1  e E(z+zy)

fY1 (y) dy : (A.4)
By substituting (A.3) into (A.4), the CDF of Z is derived as
FZ (z) = 1  e Ez + E!2ze E(1 !2)zE1 (E!2z) ; (A.5)
where E1 (x) is the exponential integral function given by
E1 (x) =
R1
1
e xtt 1dt [12]. Taking the derivative of FZ (z)
given in (A.5) w.r.t. z, we obtain the PDF of Z. Then
substituting the PDF of Z into (A.2) and using [12, Eq.
(6.227.1)], we obtain the desired result in (6).
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Based on (8), we first calculate the secrecy outage proba-
bility conditioned on Y1 as
P outRJBR (Y1) =
MY
m=1
Pr

Dm <
Pm
Qt
(  1) + 
E
m
1 + Y1

=(1  !1)M +
MX
m=1

M
m

(1  !1)M m (!1(!3   1))
m
(Y1 + !3)
m :
(B.1)
The P outRJBR is derived as
P outRJBR =
Z 1
0
fY1 (y)P
out
RJBR (y) dy : (B.2)
Substituting (A.3) and (B.1) into (B.2), we get the desired
result in (9).
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